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Abstract 
In this  paper  we  study  the  location  behaviour  of a  foreign  and  a  domestic  multinational  (MNE) 
competing a la Cournot in the domestic product market both under free trade and under the optimal 
domestic trade policy.  Both firms  produce a homogenous  good using a  labour intensive technology. 
While the domestic country is unionised,  the foreign  country is  not.  We find that when foreign  wage 
levels  are relatively  low,  both  firms  agglomerate in  the  South  (North-South  FDI)  and  the  optimal 
government intervention is a zero tariff on imports. For intermediate wage levels abroad, no FDI occurs 
and the optimal government intervention is a tariff either lower or equal to the rent extracting tariff a  la 
Brander and Spencer (1984). For relatively high foreign wage levels, the optimal tariff is such that both 
firms agglomerate in the domestic country (North-North FDI). At least three important insights evolve 
from this paper. Firstly, when the labour market is unionised, trade and FDI are clearly not substitutes. 
Secondly, when firms are footloose,  the optimal domestic tariff is  always lower or equal to the tariff 
policy in the absence of relocation possibilities.  Thirdly,  a tariff,  deterring outward FDI or inducing 
inward FDI can improve domestic welfare. 
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According to  the  Economist (October 3rd 1998)  the  growth in  FDI between  1990  and 
1997 was about 100%, compared to a growth figure of 'only' 60% of  trade in dollars. Further 
evidence suggests that while most FDI still goes to developed countries, a growing share is 
going  to  developing  countries.  The  empirical  importance  of FDI  has  triggered  a  growing 
number of  both empirical and theoretical papers trying to identify the determinants ofFDI. An 
early empirical study by Lun (1980) on US  FDI in the EC concluded by stating that 'FDI is 
concerned with the decisions made by the managers of large multinational firms  (MNEs) and 
the best way to study FDI is to study MNEs'. Since MNEs are usually large firms with market 
power, theoretical analysis has predominantly relied on the use  of imperfect competition to 
study their behaviour, and this is also the purpose of  our paper. 
We develop a simple partial equilibrium model that could easily be embedded into a more 
elaborate general equilibrium model, consisting of  two footloose MNEs, one domestic and one 
foreign.  The  firms  sell  a homogenous  product  and engage  in  Cournot  competition  in the 
domestic market but can locate either in the domestic or in the foreign country. Focussing on 
the  domestic product market is  similar to  assuming that the  foreign product market size  is 
relatively small which greatly facilitates the analysis.  We  assume the domestic country to be 
unionised with a monopoly union setting the wage for the imperfectly competitive sector.  I  The 
domestic wage level is endogenous depending upon the number of MNE ' s that locate in the 
domestic market. The wage in the  foreign country is  exogenous and can be higher or lower 
than the domestic wage level. 
We first study the firms'  location pattern in the case of free  trade.  FDI, both inward and 
outward are  however not always  in the  domestic  country's interest.  Since there  is  a strong 
I  We disregard the coexistence of smaller domestic firms that are not footloose. presumption that tariff barriers to trade directly affect FDI, we allow the domestic government 
to use a tariff to  affect firms'  locations. Although under current WTO rules it is increasingly 
difficult  for  a  country  or trade  bloc  to  unilaterally  impose  a  tariff,  the  use  of alternative 
protection in the form of antidumping measures for example continues to be possible. 
The trade  off both firms  are  facing  is whether to produce in the foreign  country with a 
competitive wage rate,  but possibly incurring a tariff cost when shipping their goods to the 
domestic country, or to produce in the domestic country with a wage rate set by the monopoly 
union for the entire industry. We find that when foreign wage levels are relatively low, both 
firms  agglomerate  in  the  foreign  country  (North-South FD!)  and  the  optimal  government 
intervention is to set a tariff of zero on imports. This result can be compared to CordelIa and 
Grilo (1998).  They find that when a vertically differentiated domestic industry relocates to a 
low wage country in order to ship their goods back to the domestic country, the  case for  a 
social clause  policy imposed by the  domestic  government is weaker,  the  lower the  foreign 
wage.2 
For  intermediate  wage  levels  abroad,  in  our  model  no  FDI  occurs  and  the  optimal 
government intervention is a tariff which is either lower or equal to the rent extracting tariff a 
la Brander and Spencer (1981).  For relatively high foreign wage  levels,  the optimal tariff is 
such that both firms agglomerate in the domestic country (North-North FD!). 
The  empirical  evidence  on the  importance  of relative  wage  costs  in  explaining  FD!  is 
mixed.  While  Barrell  and Pain  (1996)  find  a  significantly positive relationship  between  the 
level of US unit labour cost and the level of outward investment, Wheeler and Moody (1992) 
find labour costs to  be relatively unimportant in explaining US  FD!. Norman (1998) suggest 
2 Cordelia and Grilo (1998) state that'  a social clause can be understood as an import tax to be returned to the 
exporting  low  wage  countries  in  the  form  of aid  programs  aimed  at  the  development  of better  working 
conditions' . 
2 that it may be difficult to  generalise about push and pull factors of FDI since they may vary 
across  sectors.  Case evidence  definitely suggests that for  a number of activities wage  costs 
playa crucial role in choosing location. In the year this paper was being prepared, four well 
known MNE's (Renault, Levis Jeans, Duparc stockings and Boston Scientific)  relocated their 
activities from Belgium to low wage countries, publicly admitting that the high Belgian wage 
costs were the reason for their departure.3 
Very few  papers have  looked at  the  effect of unions on FDI.  A theoretical  analysis by 
Bughin and Vannini (1995) fmds that central union bargaining whereby the MNE is subject to 
union wage setting acts as an effective deterrent for FDI. A recent empirical paper by Pain and 
Wakelin (1998) also suggests a negative relationship between unionisation and the degree of 
US FDI in Europe. 
The  evidence  on  the  effect  of tariff barriers  is  more  divided.  Blonigen  (1997)  and 
Belderbos (1997) fail to find empirical evidence of antidumping tariff jumping FDI by Japanese 
firms in the US and the EC respectively. This goes against what one would expect on the basis 
of the conventional trade theory. However, This 'empirical puzzle' as Blonigen (1997) puts it, 
becomes less puzzling in a framework that allows firms  to engage in FDI in response to the 
'threat' of tariff protection in their export market. From our analysis it is clear that the threat 
of protection can be  sufficient to trigger inward FDI,  in which case a tariff is  never actually 
observed.  Staiger and Wolak  (1991)  have  long  shown that the mere  existence of the  AD-
legislation affects trade flows even without AD-measures being imposed. 
The analysis we present below draws upon three strands of literature which differ in their 
degree of maturity. The first  consists of the theory of trade policy under oligopoly (Brander 
3 Renault by means of  president Schweizer made several public statements about wage costs in Belgium being 
too  high to  justify further  car  assembly  of Renault.  A new  plant was  opened in Russia.  Levis  and  Duparc 
3 and Spencer, 1984 and 1985) that has been developed since the early nineteen eighties. In this 
literature firms  are assumed to  have fixed locations and the  existence of footloose MNEs is 
largely ignored. In contrast, the role of the government in setting optimal trade policy is well 
developed. One of the main results arising from this literature is that a domestic government 
has an incentive to unilaterally set an optimal rent-extracting tariff on foreign imports, thereby 
increasing domestic welfare. In our model we allow both firms to be footloose and show that 
the optimal trade policy is always lower or equal than in the Brander and Spencer (1984) case. 
A second strand of literature we draw upon is the one that studies the decision of MNEs 
either  to  provide  a  distant  market  through  exports  or  to  engage  in  FDI  (Smith,  1987; 
Horstmann and Markusen,  1992; Rowthorn,  1992;  Motta,  1992;  and Bughin and Vannini, 
1995). In this literature the equilibrium location of firms typically depends on the level of the 
fixed costs and the wage rate abroad versus the transport and tariff costs. The role of  product 
differentiation  has  also  been  discussed  more  recently  (De  Fraja  and Norman,  1998  and 
CordelIa  and Grilo  (1998)).  Typically  in this  literature  it is  assumed that  the  role  of the 
government is limited. Tariff barriers usually consist of a parameter varying between zero and 
the prohibitive level in order to model extreme degrees of  market integration. In our model we 
look for  the  optimal level  of the  tariff rather than treating tariff/transport costs as  a mere 
parameter in the analysis. 
A  third  strand  of literature  we  draw  upon  is  concerned with  the  effect  of economic 
integration on labour markets (Mezzetti  and Dinopoulos  1991;  Huizinga  1992;  Wes  1995; 
Bughin and Vannini,  1995; Naylor, 1998; and Zhao,  1995). A number of papers have argued 
that  firm mobility curbs union power and leads  to  lower wages (Mezzetti and Dinopoulos, 
1991; Wes, 1995; and Zhao, 1995). This result is obtained when the location decision of firms 
Stockings  admitted that  Central  Europe  had become  a more  attractive  location  for  them  to  cary  out  their 
4 occurs after unions bargain over wages.  In the model we  develop below we focus  on trade 
policy which is why we assume a domestic monopoly union to set the wage after the location 
decision of the firms which excludes the  'threat of relocation' possibility of firms vis-a-vis the 
domestic  union.  An interesting extension of our present analysis however would consist in 
reversing these two stages. 
At least three important insights  evolve  from  this paper.  First,  our findings  support the 
notion that trade and FDI are not substitutes. Similar to Vandenbussche and Konings (1998) 
we show that the effects of  trade on the domestic labour market are very different from those 
of inward  FDI.  Furthermore,  when  the  domestic  firm  locates  in the  foreign  country,  FDI 
results in an increase rather than a reduction in cross border trade flows.  The complementary 
nature of FDI and trade  largely absent in traditional trade theory has  also been established 
empirically (pain and Wakelin, 1998). Second, when firms are footloose, the optimal domestic 
tariff is always lower or equal to the tariff policy in the absence of  relocation possibilities. And 
third, in the presence of domestic union rents, a tariff that deters outward FDI by a domestic 
firm  or inducing inward FDI by a foreign firm,  can be welfare improving whereas the usual 
motivation  for  tariffs  under  imperfect  competition  is  based upon  shifting  profits  from  the 
foreign firm. 
2. The Model 
In a two-country model, the home market is  supplied with a homogeneous product by a 
Cournot duopoly consisting of a home firm and a foreign firm. The home finn, labelled as fmn 
one, is owned by shareholders in the home country while the foreign firm, labelled as firm two, 
is  owned by shareholders in the  foreign  country.  Each  finn has  to  decide  where  to  locate 
activities. Boston Scientific moved to Ireland (Trends Review n05, 1998) 
5 production. The wage for  the imperfectly competitive sector in the home country is set by  a 
monopoly union that maximises union rent, while the labour market in the foreign country is 
perfectly competitive. All consumption of  the oligopolistic product occurs in the home market 
where the market price, P, is given by the linear inverse demand function:  P = a - /3(q, +q2) 
where  q,  is the output of firm one and  q2  is the output of firm two. Total production in the 
home country is  qH  while total production in the foreign market is  qF  so  qH +qF =q, +q2' 
The  labour required  to  produce  one  unit  of the  oligopolistic  product is  aH  in  the  home 
country and  aF  in the  foreign  country.  The  wage  set by the  monopoly union in the  home 
country is  wH  while the competitive wage is w H  in the home country and  wF  in the foreign 
country. Hence, the unit labour cost of the oligopolistic industry is  (£)H  = a H w H  in the home 
country and  (£)F =aFwF  in the foreign country.4  Unit labour costs in the two counties may 
differ due to differences in productivity and/or wage rates. 
Although  our model  has  a  strong  partial  equilibrium flavour,  we  implicitly assume the 
existence of a perfectly competitive numeraire sector that pays the competitive wage rate in 
both countries. The numeraire sector is assumed to  absorb labour freed up in the imperfectly 
competitive sector at the competitive wage rate. Trade in the numeraire good also ensures that 
trade between the two countries is balanced. 
In terms of  the labour market, we assume that domestic workers in the oligopolistic sector 
belong to  a monopoly union  that sets  the  wage  rate  to  maximise  union rent  while  foreign 
workers are not unionised and are  paid the competitive wage rate.  In this paper, we  do not 
allow firm level bargaining but simply assume that domestic wages are  set by the monopoly 
union for the  entire oligopolistic industry in  the  domestic  country.  To consider Nash wage 
4 Although we do not explicitly model transport costs, they are implicitly present in the analysis since the 
foreign unit labour cost could include transport costs without affecting the analysis. 
6 bargaining  like  in  (Bughin  and  Vannini  1995;  Vandenbussche  and Konings,  1998)  would 
require  a  distinction  between  fI= and  sector  level  wage  bargaining  which  would  be an 
interesting extension of our analysis but will not be pursued here. 
As usual in the literature on trade under imperfect competition, we  assume  quasi-linear 
preferences for the domestic consumers so that income effects are zero and hence consumer 
surplus is a valid welfare measure.5 This assumption implies that domestic workers surplus and 
shareholders profIts do not affect total demand. This is equivalent to assuming that the number 
of domestic workers and shareholders in the oligopolistic industry is  small compared to  the 
total number of consumers. 
The structure of  the game is as follows: At stage one, the home government sets its tariff 
to maximise the welfare of the home country. Then, at the second stage, the two fI=s each 
decide either to locate in their own country or to  locate production in the  other countr/. 
Wherever each fI= decides to locate, both the home and the foreign country involve a fIxed 
cost  which  we  will  not  explicitly  take  on  board  in  the  analysis  but  which  secures  that 
production will  only  take  place  in  one  location  (either  the  home  country  or  the  foreign 
country). After the fI=s have committed to their locations, in the third stage of the game, the 
monopoly union in the home country sets its wage to maximise its union rent. Finally, at the 
fourth stage of  the game, the fi=s compete as Coumot duopolists taking the union wage and 
the tariff as given. As usual, the game is solved by backward induction to obtain the sub-game 
perfect equilibrium. 
5 Relaxing this assumption and allowing for income effects could lessen or strengthen the results we get but 
would not change the direction of the results. 
6 Our analyis could also apply to regions within Europe. For example France, with a rigid labour market, has 
accused the UK, with a much more flexible labour market, of social dumping in the French product market 
(Leahy and Montagna, 1999). 
7 In the  fmal  stage of the  game,  the two ftnns compete as  Cournot duopolists taking as 
given the tariff (t), the union wage (w  H)  in the home country and the fixed cost (F) which is 
equal in both the home and the foreign country.7 As costs depend upon location, the proftts of 
the two ftrms will depend upon where the ftrms  are  located. Hence, the proftts of the two 
ftrms are: 
if ftrm 1 locates in the home country 
if  ftrm 1 locates in the foreign country 
(1) 
if ftrm 2  locates in the foreign country 
if  ftrm 2  locates to the home country 
Each ftrm independently and simultaneously sets its output to maximise its proftts, and this 
yields the ftrst-order conditions for proftt maximisation. Since demand is assumed to be linear, 
it is straightforward to solve for the Cournot equilibrium outputs and market price in the four 
possible outcomes: 
Equation (2)  Firm 1 stays in home country  Firm 1 relocates to foreign 
country 
Firm 2 stays in the  qfS  == (a - 2WH +WF + t  )/313  q~S == (a-wF  -t)/3j3 
foreign country  q~S == (a + wH  - 2wF  - 2t )/3 13  q:s == (a -WF - t)/3j3 
pSs  == (a +WH + wF  + t)/3  pRS  == (a + 2wF  + 2t )/3 
7 The fixed cost prevents firms from locating in both markets at the same time. Or to put it differently, the 
fixed cost ensures indivisibility of  production. In addition the fixed cost explains the oligopolistic nature of the 
industry we consider. 
8 Firm 2 relocates to  q{R =  (a - OJH )/3 [3  q~  =  (a +  OJH  - 20JF  - 2t )/3[3 
the home country  q;R =  (a - OJH )/3 [3  q~ =  (a - 20JH +  OJF + t  )/3[3 
pSR =  (a +  20JH )/3 
pRR =  (a +OJH  +OJF + t )/3 
At the thIrd stage of the game, the monopoly umon III the home country sets Its wage to 
maximise union rent given the locations  of the  firms.  Union rent is  equal to  the total wage 
premium paid to  union members:  U = (wH  - w H )lH' where  employment in  the  oligopolistic 
is the competitive unit labour cost in the home country. Obviously, if  both firms are located in 
the home country then the monopoly union is in a strong position whereas if no firms locate in 
the home  country then it has  no monopoly power whatsoever.  Maximising union rent with 
respect to the unit labour cost yields the following first-order condition: 
(3) 
Since the Coumot equilibrium outputs (2) are linear functions of the unit labour cost it is 
straightforward  to  solve  this  first-order  condition  in  the  four  possible  outcomes  for  the 
monopoly unit labour cost in the home country: 
Equation (4)  Firm 1 stays in home country  Firm 1 relocates to foreign 
country 
Firm 2 stays in the  OJ;; =  (a+2wH  +OJF +t)/4  OJ~s =  wH 
foreign country 
Firm 2 relocates to the  OJ;: =  (a + w H )/2  OJ: =  (a + 2wH +OJF +t)/4 
home country 
9 Having solved for the Coumot equilibrium outputs, market price, and the monopoly-unit 
labour cost, (2) and (4), it is now possible to solve for the maximised profits of the two firms 
in the four possible outcomes: 
Equation (5)  Firm 1 stays in home country  Firm 1 relocates to foreign country 
Firm 2 stays in  nss =  (a-2wH  HOF  +t)'  F  rr RS =  (a-OJF -tY 
I  36{3  I  9f3  F 
the foreign 
nSs =  (Sa+2wH-7OJF -7t)'  F  RS  (a-OJ  -tY  country  ,  144{3  rr  =  F  F 
2  9f3 
Firm 2 relocates  (a-WHY  n RR =  (Sa+2wH -7wF -7t)'  rr SR  F  F 
I  36f3 
I  144{3 
to the home 
rr SR =  (a-wH  Y  n RR =  (a-2wH  +WF +t)'  F  country  F  '  36{3 
2  36f3 
At the second stage of the game, the firms have to decIde whether to locate ill therr own 
country or locate in the other country. Depending upon relative unit labour costs in the two 
countries there are three possible outcomes: firstly, an outcome which we refer to by Outward 
FDI because  in  this  Nash  equilibrium  the  home  firm  decides  to  locate  production  to  the 
foreign  country;  secondly,  the  No  FDI outcome  where  both  firms  produce  in  their  own 
country; thirdly, Inward FDI where the foreign firm locates production to the home country.8 
When describing the  three equilibria listed above we will use the No  FDI equilibrium, with 
each firm  located in its  own market,  as  a point of reference.  A change  to  that equilibrium 
(regime) either involves the home firm moving abroad or the foreign frrm moving in the home 
country's borders, hence the labels inward FDI and outward FDI respectively. 
8 Our model in fact has four outcomes rather than three. The No FDI equilibrium where there is one firm in 
each market involves two possibilities: either each firm is in its own market or each firm is in the other market. 
Given the great similarity between these equilibria we have focussed on the equilibrium where each firm is 
located in its own market namely where its shareholders are. 
10 Outward FDI is  a Nash equilibrium if rr~s > rr~s  and  rr~s > rr~ but,  since  rr~s = rr~s 
and  rrfs = rr~,  these  two  inequalities  are  equivalent;  hence,  outward  FDI  is  a  Nash 
equilibrium  if  unit  labour  costs  III  the  foreign  country  are  sufficiently  low: 
wF  + t < A == (a + 2wH  )/3 . No FDI is a Nash equilibrium if rrfs >  rr~s and  rr~s > rr;R ; hence, 
no  FDI  is  a  Nash  equilibrium  if  A < wF + t < B == (3a + 4w H )/7.  Inward  FDI  is  a  Nash 
equilibrium if rrfR  >  rr~ and  rr~R >  rr~s  but,  since m R =  rr~R  and  rr~ =  rr~s , these two 
inequalities are equivalent; hence, inward FDI is a Nash equilibrium ifunit labour costs in the 
foreign country are sufficiently high:  (i)F + t > B . 
Proposition 1. Outward FDI occurs if  (i)F + t < A; no FDI occurs if A < w F + t < B; and 
inward FDI occurs if  wF + t > B . 
Note that outward FDI occurs if  the foreign unit labour cost is less than the monopoly unit 
labour cost in the home country. With inward FDI, the foreign finn realises that if it relocates 
to the home country then the monopoly unit labour cost in the home country will increase as 
inward FDI increases the power of  the monopoly union. Therefore, inward FDI will not occur 
when the monopoly unit labour cost in  the  home  country is just less  than the  foreign  unit 
labour  cost.  Only when the  monopoly unit labour cost in the  home country is  significantly 
lower than the  foreign  unit  labour cost will the  foreign  finn have an  incentive to relocate. 
Thus, there is a region where no FDI occurs. 
3. Free Trade 
Having  solved the  location  game played between the  two  firms,  it  is  now possible  to 
analyse the effects of outward and inward FDI on consumer surplus, profits, union rent, and 
11 welfare under free trade,  t = O.  Above it was shown that as the foreign unit labour cost rises 
there  are· regime  switches from outward FDI to  no FDI then from no FDI to inward FDI. 
Again in our description of the welfare components we will use the No FDI regime as a point 
of reference. The jumps in variables that occur at the regime switches will be interpreted as the 
effects of  inward or outward FDI. The analytical results that are presented are entirely general 
for the  particular functional form of linear demand,  but particular parameter values will be 
used to  illustrate  these  results  in a  number of graphs  (the  particular parameter values are 
a=10,  f3  =1, w H  =1, aH =aF  =1, and F=O). 
From proposition 1 it is clear that for t =  0  there are two critical values of W F  labelled as 
A andB, where regime switches occur. It is good to keep in mind that for all foreign unit costs 
below A, there is outward FDf.  In this regime both firms agglomerate in the foreign country 
where  wages  are  low  (so  called  North-South  FDI).  For all  foreign  labour  costs  ranging 
between A and B, there is No  FDf,  with each firm staying in its own market. And the third 
regime of inward FDf occurs for all foreign labour costs higher than B with the foreign firm 
relocating to the home country. Hence for high foreign labour costs we get a regime where 
both firms agglomerate in the home country (so called North-North FDI). We now analyse all 
the  welfare  components  in  these  three  FDI  regimes  under  free  trade  starting  with  firms' 
profits. 
The profits of  firm one under free trade for the three FDI regimes can be shown to be: 
l
(a_WFN9f3_F.  ifWF<A 
niT =  (a-2wH+wFN36f3-F  if A<WF <B 
(a-wHN36f3-F  ifWF>B 
(6) 
12 Figure  1 shows the  profits of firm one  as  a function  of the  foreign labour cost for the 
particular parameter values. In general, the profits of  firm one are continuous at point A where 
rr;T =  4(a -WH Y  /81{3 - F  so outward FDfhas no effect on the profits of  firm one. There is a 
discontinuity at point B which divides the No FDI regime from the inward FDI regime. There 
the  profits  of  firm  one  fall  from  2S(a - wH Y  /441{3 - F  under  No  FDf  down  to 
(a-w H Y/36{3-F  under inward FDf.  The domestic wage is  a function of the number of 
firms  located  in  the  domestic  market.  In  the  inward  FDI  regime,  the  domestic  union 
determines the wage rate paid by the two firms which is higher than the home wage prevailing 
in the No  FDf regime when there  is  only one  firm  in the home  country.  This explains the 
reduction in home firm's profits going from the No FDf  to the inward FDf regime. 
The profits of  firm two under free trade can be shown to be: 
!
(a_OJpN9{3_F  ifOJp <A 
rr;T =  (Sa+2w H -7OJpN144{3-F  if A<OJp <B 
(a-w H N36{3-F  ifOJF>B 
(7) 
In  general,  the  profits  of  firm  two  are  continuous  at  point  A  where 
rr;r=4(a-w H N81{3-F  and  at point B  where  rr;r=(a-w H N36{3-F. Hence,  both 
outward and inward FDI have no effect on the profits of firm two. 
Consumer surplus in the domestic country under free trade in the three FDI regimes can be 
shown to be: 
13 1
2(a_COP)2/9/3  if  cop <A 
Vn' =  (7a-2roH -5cop?!288/3  if A<cop <B 
2(a-ro H ? /36/3  if  cop >B 
(8) 
Consumer surplus as a function of  the foreign unit labour cost for the particular parameter 
values  is  continuous at point A  where  Vn' = 8(a -ro H Y  /81/3. Hence outward FDI has no 
effect  on  market  price  or  consumer  surplus.  There  is  a  discontinuity  at  point  B  where 
consumer surplus drops from  289(a - roH ?  /3 528/3  under No  FDI down to  (a - roH Y  /18/3 
under inward FDI.  As explained above, inward FDI increases the home wage level which in 
tum results  in higher domestic  price  level.  This  explains the  reduction  in home  consumer 
welfare going from the No FDI to the inward FDI regime. 
Union rent in the home country under free trade can be shown to be: 
(9) 
Figure 2 shows the home union rents one as  a function of the foreign labour cost for the 
particular parameter values. In general, there are discontinuities in union rent at point A where 
it jumps from 0 under outward FDI up to  2(a - roH f /27/3  under No  FDI and at point B 
where it jumps up  from  25(a-ro H ?/294/3  under no  FDlto  (a-ro H ?/6/3  under inward 
FDI.  Hence, taking the No FDI regime as a reference point, outward FDI reduces union rent 
and inward FDI increases union rent. The domestic MNE relocates production facilities when 
unit labour costs abroad are lower than in the home country. This outward FDI results in a 
loss of domestic union rent. It will become clear in the next section that the home government 
14 will want to affect the home firm's private incentive to relocate whenever the efficiency gain 
(lower wages) from relocating abroad is lower than the union rent lost. 
Welfare in the home country under free  trade consisting of consumer surplus, profits of 
firm one and union rents WH  = V(P) +  II! + U, can be shown to be: 
F  if A<WF <B  (10) 
Figure three shows welfare of the home country as a function of the foreign unit labour 
cost for the particular parameter values.  In general, home welfare is continuous and strictly 
decreasing in the foreign unit labour cost until point A where home welfare is  discontinuous 
and jumps up from  4(a - wH 'f /27  {3 - F  under outward FDIto 2(a - wH 'f /9  {3 - F  under no 
FDI. At point B home welfare again jumps up from  263(a-wH )2 /1176{3 -F under no FDI 
to  (a - w H 'f /4  {3 - F  under inward FDI.  Hence,  taking No  FDI  as  a  point of reference, 
outward FDI reduces home welfare and inward FDI increases home welfare.  Since we saw 
that  outward FDI has  no  effect  on  home  profits  and  no  effect on consumer surplus,  the 
reduction in home welfare at point A, is solely caused by the reduction in union rents. 
Welfare in the foreign country under free  trade is just equal to the profits of the foreign 
firm.  Aggregate world welfare is therefore given by aFT  = W:: + II;T.  Since the profits of 
firm two  are continuous, the jumps in world welfare are due  to the jumps in home welfare. 
World welfare falls with outward FDI and increases with inward FDI. 
The  results  of this  section  for  outward FDI under  free  trade  are  summarised  in  the 
following proposition: 
15 Proposition 2: Outward FDI reduces union rent so  consequently reduces the welfare of 
the home country and aggregate world welfare. 
Since outward FDI occurs when the foreign unit labour cost is just equal to the monopoly 
unit labour cost in the home country (point A), it has no effect on the marginal cost of  firm one 
so  does not affect the  profits  of firm  one  or the market price.  Hence,  the only effect is  to 
eliminate the union rent and thereby to  reduce the welfare of the home country.9  Aggregate 
world welfare falls because the actual costs of  producing in the home country are lower than in 
the  foreign  country but the  union  wage  has  driven  firm  one  to  relocate  production to  the 
foreign country. 
The results of  this section for inward FDI under free trade are summarised in the following 
proposition: 
Proposition  3: Inward FDI increases  union  rent,  reduces  the  profits of  firm  one and 
consumer surplus.  Inward FDI increases  the  welfare of the  home country  and aggregate 
world welfare. 
With inward FDI, firm two realises that if it relocates to the home country then the power 
of the monopoly union will be increased and both firms will face a higher union wage than if 
there is no FDI. Hence, firm two will relocate production to the home country even though the 
monopoly unit labour cost when it relocates will be higher than the foreign unit labour cost. It 
faces a higher unit labour cost but so does its competitor, and these two effects exactly offset 
each other for firm two.  Firm one  faces  a higher monopoly union wage  as  a result of firm 
two's relocation so its profits are reduced, the market price is increased and consumer surplus 
is reduced. Although consumer surplus and the profits of firm one are reduced, the welfare of 
9  Unions  are  not the only mechanism that can drive this result.  Other distortions in  the labour market like 
efficiency wages which result in wages  levels  above  the marginal product  of labour would  also  lead to  the 
result described in proposition 2. 
16 the home country increases because the increase in union rent outweighs the other two effects. 
This is because the reduction in the profits of firm one and consumer surplus mainly represent 
transfers from firm one and consumers to the union so they have no effect on the welfare of 
the home country. (Note that there is an efficiency loss due to the increase in the power of  the 
monopoly union but this  is  relatively  small).  The welfare  gain  comes  from  the union  rent 
eamed by workers employed by firm two, but this is  not at the expense of firm two since it 
comes from the union capturing part of  the home country's efficiency advantage. 
4. Optimum Tariff 
The  private  relocation  of firms  under  free  trade  are  not  always in the  interest  of the 
domestic country as measured by the sum of profits of firm one, consumer surplus and union 
rents. Hence, we tum our attention to the first stage of the model where we assume the home 
country to  pursue an optimal trade policy. Consider the optimum tariff of the home country 
assuming that the foreign country passively pursues a policy of free trade. Since the tariff will 
affect the firms' location decisions, the optimum policy will be rather complex and will involve 
comparisons of welfare  in  different  regimes.  The  situation  is  best  described  in figure  four 
where the tariff is  plotted against the foreign unit labour cost.  In the region below the 00 
curve, which has a slope of minus one, there will be outward FDI,  OJF  < A - t , while in the 
region above the II curve,  which also has a slope of minus  one,  there will be  inward FDI, 
OJF  > B - t . In the region in between the lines 00 and II there will be no FDI. And, this holds 
for the range of foreign wage lying in between A - t <  OJ  F  < B - t . 
In the region with outward FDI (below 00), both firms are located in the foreign country 
so imports are equal to  qF =  ql +  q2 =  Q. With outward FD!, the rent of the home monopoly 
17 union is equal to zero since there is no production in the home country. Hence, the welfare of 
the home country is given by the sum of consumer surplus, the profits of firm one, and tariff 
revenue: 
(11) 
Maximising the welfare of the home country with respect to the tariff yields the first-order 
condition: 
aw;s  ap  aql  aQ 
--=-q -+(p-co )-+t-+Q=O  at  2  at  F at  at  (12) 
Using the result from (2) to solve this first-order condition yields the optimal tariff tRS =0. 
Hence when the foreign unit labour cost is low, the optimal policy for the home government is 
to set a zero tariff and to allow outward FDI occur. IO  When the domestic firm locates abroad, 
union  rent  is  lost but  the  efficiency  gain  to  the  domestic  firm  in terms  of higher profits 
outweighs the loss of  union rent, which is why the home government allows the domestic firm 
to go. The optimal policy of a zero tariff for low foreign unit labour costs is indicated in figure 
four by the line between the origin and point C (see below) along the horizontal axis. 
However, as the  foreign unit labour cost increases, the  efficiency gain to the home firm 
from  moving abroad is reduced.  The critical value of foreign unit labour cost where home 
government policy will change is  coF =  C == ((38 -4m}x + (4m - 16  :PJ  H )/22 .  At this level of 
foreign unit labour cost,  the home firm still has a private incentive to relocate (C < A) but 
10  This result is in part assumption specific. It depends on the linearity of the inverse demand curves and the 
fact that there is one domestic and one foreign firm. It can be shown that when demand is convex, the optimal 
tariff is positive while for concave demand, the optimal tariff is negative (equivalent to an import subsidy). The 
size of the optimal tariff also depends on the number of domestic versus the number of  foreign firms which are 
located abroad. In a model with more than two firms,  the size and sign of the optimal tariff depends on the 
relative number of foreign  firms.  The optimal tariff is  increasing in  the number of foreign firms.  However, 
despite the assumption specific nature of the zero tariff, it remains true that the optimal tariff will always be 
lowest for low foreign wage countries. 
18 relocation is  not in the  home  country's interest.  Therefore, the home gove=ent will set a 
tariff so that it is no longer profitable for the home firm to relocate to the foreign country. 
For the home gove=ent to prevent outward FDI beyond point C,  it will have  to set a 
tariff higher than that given by the line 00. To derive the optimal tariff policy, first  consider 
what is the home welfare in the interior of the region with no FDI,  (in between 00 and II). 
The home welfare now includes home union rent and is given by: 
(13) 
where  II~s + uSs = (p - w H )ql . Maximising the welfare of the home country with respect to 
the tariff yields the first-order condition: 
aw;S  ap  aql  '  aQ 
--=-q -+(p-ro )-+r-+Q=O  at  2  at  F  at  at 
(14) 
Thus, solving this first-order condition using equations (2) to (5) yields the optimal tariff 
prevailing in the no FDI area lying in between the lines 00 and II: 
In  figure  four,  this  optimal tariff is given by the  line  TT.  This  line corresponds with the 
optimal rent extracting tariff derived by Brander and Spencer (1984) when firms  have  fixed 
locations. In figure four, the no FDI area is the only area where firms do not have an incentive 
to move. Hence, the tariff given by the line labelled TT here is only relevant for that part of  TT 
that lies between the lines 00 and II,  and for  values of the foreign unit labour cost greater 
than C. 
For values of the foreign unit labour cost greater than D,  roF  > D == (9a + 89w H )/98, the 
tariff given by the line  TT no  longer yields an interior solution and the home country has to 
19 compare welfare under no FDI with welfare under inward FDI. It turns out that for values of 
the  foreign unit  cost between the  foreign  wage  level  D  and E  in  figure  four,  D:::; (J)F  :::; E 
where D == (9a + 89m H )/98  and E == (S3a +  l43m H )/196, the No FDI regime with a tariff that 
just prevents  the  foreign  finn  from  engaging  in  inward  FDI  is  optimal.  This  is  achieved 
through a tariff just £ below the line II. By setting this tariff the home country ensures that the 
foreign  finn does not want to  relocate.  For this  range  of the  foreign  unit  costs the  home 
country is  better off by extracting rent  from  the  foreign  finn through a tariff than through 
higher union rents. 
However, once the foreign unit cost level exceeds a critical value,  (J)F > E , the optimum 
tariff changes. For values of the foreign unit cost greater than E,  it is  optimal for  the home 
government to set a tariff level above the level given by the II curve. For this range of foreign 
unit costs, the foreign finn will relocate to the home country and the home union can extract 
more rent from the foreign finn than a tariff can if  the foreign finn had remained in the foreign 
country. This is why the home government decides to set a tariff which is high enough to alter 
the foreign finn's private incentives to relocate compared to free trade. By choosing any tariff 
above line II, the foreign finn will want to relocate to the home country. In Figure 4 we have 
assumed an 'efficient' home government that sets a tariff just £ above the II line. Note that the 
foreign wage level at which the inward FDI regime starts under the optimal tariff policy (E) is 
smaller than the  foreign wage level at which the inward FDI regime started under free trade 
(indicated by B in figure 4). The optimal tariff policy derived above can be summarised in the 
following proposition: 
20 Proposition 4: The optimum tariff is:  t = 0 for  OJF < C;  t = (15a - 2wH -13OJF  )/41 for 
C<OJF<D;  t=(3a+4wH-7OJF)j7-t: for  D<OJF<E; and  t~(3a+4wH-7OJF)j7 for 
The optimal tariff policy is  illustrated in figure 4 for a particular set of parameter values: 
for  0 < OJF < C , there is outward FDI and the optimal home tariff is zero, for  C <  OJF < E , 
there is No FDI and the optimal tariff is positive. The No FDI regime can be divided into two 
parts  namely for  C <  OJF < D, the tariff corresponds with the  Brander and Spencer (1984) 
optimal profit shifting tariff while for  D < OJF  < E , the tariff is the highest tariff in the No FDI 
regime.  For  OJF  > E , there is  inward FDI and the  optimal tariff can be set at any level that 
induces inward FDI, which includes a zero tariff for  OJF  > B . 
5. Discussion of Results 
The  tariff level  given  by  the  line  TT in  figure  four  corresponds  to  the  optimal  rent 
extracting tariff derived by Brander and Spencer (1984) when firms have fixed locations. Our 
analysis  developed above  has  just shown that when  firms  are  footloose,  the  optimal tariff 
policy changes drastically (proposition 4) and the tariff a  la Brander and Spencer only holds 
for  a particular range of the foreign labour unit costs (between C and D). Our fmdings also 
show  why  the  existence  of tariff-jumping  FDI  may  be  difficult  to  establish  empirically as 
Blonigen (1998) and Belderbos (1997) have found.  When the tariff is set optimally, the tariff 
and  FDI  are  both  endogenously  determined  by the  relative  unit  labour  costs  in  the  two 
countries. We show that high tariffs will occur in the regime with no FDI whereas low tariffs 
21 will occur in the regime with inward FDI so  that a negative  correlation might be observed 
between tariffs and inward FDI in empirical work. 
It is also worth noting that from figure one it can be seen that the profits of  the home firm 
are higher under free  trade than under the optimal tariff policy. Hence the home firm should 
oppose protection and be in favour of free  trade.ll Figure two  indicates  that Union rent is 
always  higher under the  optimal tariff policy than under free  trade so  the union will  be in 
favour of  protection. Obviously, home welfare is higher when trade policy is set optimally than 
under free trade as can be seen from figure three. By using an optimal trade policy, the home 
country can avoid the losses that occur under free trade as a result of  outward FDI. 
According to the traditional view, FDI and Trade are  substitutes since the relocation of 
production facilities abroad was generally thought to correspond with a reduction in the trade 
flows. Our findings suggest that trade and FDI may be complements since when outward FDI 
occurs in our model, trade follows FDI. After the home firm has relocated a trade flow arises 
that previously was not there. Recent empirical evidence also goes in the direction that FDI 
need not necessarily reduce trade flows (pain and Wakelin 1998). 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we have studied the  location behaviour of a foreign firm and a home firm 
competing it la Coumot in the domestic product market both under free trade and under the 
II The  fact  that the  home  MNE  looses  from  protection  may  be  assumption  specific.  If we  were  to 
consider  Nash  bargaining  between  finn  and  union  over  wages  rather  than  the  monopoly  union 
assumption we used,  it  is  very  likely that for  a range  of the bargaining power there  exist outcomes 
where  both  the  home  union  and the  home  firm gains  from  tariff intervention.  This  can be  seen by 
considering that in the absence of a home union (the opposite of a monopoly union), finns gain under 
trade policy. In the cases where both the home  finn and union would  win from protection there is 
scope for collusion in terms of  the willingness to lobby for trade protection. But this lies beyond 
the purpose of the paper. 
22 optimal  domestic  trade  policy.  Both  finns  produce  a  homogenous  good  using  a  labour 
intensive technology. While the domestic country is unionised, the foreign country is not.  We 
found that when foreign wage levels are relatively low, both finns agglomerate in the South 
(North-South FDI) and the optimal government intervention is  a zero tariff on imports.  For 
intennediate wage levels abroad, no FDI occurs and the optimal government intervention is a 
tariff either lower or equal to the rent extracting tariff a  la Brander and Spencer. For relatively 
high foreign wage levels, the  optimal tariff is  such that both finns agglomerate in the  home 
country (North-North FDI). 
At least three important insights evolved from this paper. First, when the labour market is 
unionised, trade and FDI are  clearly not substitutes.  Second,  when finns  are  footloose,  the 
optimal domestic tariff is always lower or equal to the tariff policy in the absence of relocation 
possibilities. And third, a tariff,  deterring outward FDI or inducing inward FDI can improve 
domestic welfare. 
One final  remark is in place namely that our analysis should not be seen as a stance for 
trade policy intervention. By indicating the unilateral incentives that countries have to deviate 
from free trade we show that a continued effort in multilateral talks at the level of the WTO is 
called for  to  refrain countries from  pursuing tariff policies.  This is necessary to  avoid trade 
wars to attract FDI between countries. 
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